tional and maleficent soul or demon, unmade, and co-existing with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cause thereof. And accordingly he resolves, that as whatsoever is good in the soul and body of tBe universe, and likewise in the souls of men and demons, is to be ascribed to God as its ouly original; so whatsoever is evil, irregular and disorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other substantial principle, a t/^i} *avovgical* /ca/co7roioc, an irrational and maleficent soul or demon, —which insinuating itself every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle :[a] *KOL ^ nav elvai ipyov rov* ficou rrjv *tyvxrlv,* so that neither the soul of the universe, nor that of men and demons,, was wholly the workmanship of God, but the lower, brutish,, and disorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.

But, besides all this, it is evident, that Plutarch was also strongly possessed with a conceit, that nothing substantial could be created (no not by Divine power) out of nothing pre-existing; and, therefore, tKat all the substance of whatsoever is in the world, did exist from eternity unmade; so that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harrnonizer thereof. Wherefore, as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the substance of it, but only the pre-existing matter, which before moved disorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him ; in like manner Jie resolved, that the soul of the world (for such a thing is always supposed by him) was not made by God put of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inani-

* Plutarch, de Animae. Procreat. ex Timaeo, p. 1027.